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This paper argues that nationalism, and nationalistic activism in particular are being 
globalized. At least certain fringes of radical nationalist activists are organized as 
‘cellular systems’ connected and mobilize-able on a global scale giving birth to what I 
call ‘global nationalistic activism’. Given this change in nationalist activism, I claim that 
we should abandon all ‘methodological nationalism’. Methodological nationalism fails in 
arriving at a thorough understanding of the impact, scale and mobilization power (Tilly, 
1974) of contemorary ‘national(istic)’ political activism. Even more, it inevitably will 
contribute to the naturalization or in emic terms the meta-political goals of global 
nationalist activists. The paradox is of course evident: global nationalism uses the scale-
advantages, network effects and the benefits of cellular structures to fight for the 
(re)construction of the old 19th century vertebrate system par excellence: the (blood and 
soil) nation. Nevertheless, this, I will show, is an indisputable empirical reality: the many 
local nationalistic battles are more and more embedded in globally operating digital 
infrastructures mobilizing militants from all corners of the world for nationalist causes at 
home. Nationalist activism in the 21st century, so goes my argument, has important global 
dimensions which are easily repatriated for national use. This forces us to adjust our 
understanding of locality, nationalism and our methodological apparatus.  
Keywords: Methodological nationalism, discourse, global nationalism, network effects, 
cellular systems 
 
On 3 March 2018, the young Flemish identitarian movement ‘Schild & Vrienden’ organized an 
activist intervention to derail ludic protest of civil society organizations at the Gravensteen 
Castle in Ghent, Belgium. These civil society organizations were protesting the ‘inhuman 
European migration policies’ (Gent Insight, 2018). Schild & Vrienden showed up with 20 à 30 
activists. They pulled down the giant European flag hanging on the walls of the castle and filmed 
their intervention. This video material was then edited into a three-minute clip and uploaded on 
the Schild & Vrienden Facebook-page. The video immediately went viral. After Facebook 
banned the movie (because of copyright infringement), Schild & Vrienden re-uploaded it with a 
different soundtrack on 8 March 2018. At which point it went viral again. Up until today (30 
May 2018), the movie managed to attract 92K views, 2.2k interactions, 1,2k shares and 443 
comments. These numbers, seen from a Flemish or Belgian perspective, are impressive. They 
suggest a huge fan-base and subsequently triggered massive mainstream media attention in 
Flanders (23 articles in the Flemish press) and international attention from right wing outlets like 
the Gateway Pundit and Red Ice TV. This media coverage in turn boosted the fan – and follower 
base of Schild & Vrienden’s Facebook-page from around 4000 to over 10.000 likes.  
Methodological nationalism and global nationalism 
In order to understand this type of nationalistic activist interventions, I will argue, we need to 
adopt a global perspective. A perspective that focusses on mobility of resources and the 
layeredness of this sort of local activism. In short, if we truly want to understand identitarian and 
nationalistic activism in the 21st century, we need to overcome ‘methodological nationalism’. 
Research on politics and in particular on nationalism, to a large extend, still displays 
‘methodological nationalism (…) the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural 
social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). 
Methodological nationalism not only blurs out the fact, that the world has always been 
transnational, it especially turns a blind eye to the impact of cellular systems (Appadurai, 2006: 
27) in the construction of the contemporary (political) world.  
The rise of digitalization and mobility have created a juncture visible in the scale, the intensity 
and the scope of globalization processes (Appadurai, 1996; Arnaut e.a. 2016). Migration and 
digital media have not only reshaped our imagination of the world (Appadurai, 1996:3), they also 
enabled global (cultural) flows. Whereas in non-digital times, the transnational dimension of 
politics was to a large extend embedded in the networks of national political elites and vertebrate 
‘inter-national’ organizations, this has changed in the last decades (Appadurai, 1996: 32; Maly, 
Blommaert & Ben Yakoub, 2014). Today, digital media function as infrastructures that enable 
and structure global networked activist movements (Klein 2002, 4; Wolfson, 2014; Tufekci, 
2017). The rising importance of global networks, cellular systems and global cultural and 
political flows emblematic of this latest phase of globalization are largely undertheorized when it 
comes to nationalist activism.  
With this paper, I want to contribute to the literature on nationalism and nationalist activism in 
the 21st century. I will argue, based on a literature study and a digital ethnographic case study 
(Varis, 2016; Pink e.a., 2016; Maly, 2018), that digitalization and ‘high globalization’ have given 
birth to new forms of nationalist activism further complicating the ties between space, place, 
identity and nationalistic activism. More concretely, I will argue that in the 21st century radical 
New Right nationalist activism cannot be understood anymore from a national paradigm 
focusing on vertebrate systems. I will build the argument that political sciences, in trying to 
overcome methodological nationalism, could benefit from recent ethnographic, discourse 
analytical and sociolinguistic studies on globalization, language and culture.  
Ethnography, nationalism and an updated notion of locality  
Most research on the revival of nationalism, radical right and extreme right parties and 
movements avoids the impact of digitalization (cfe. Wodak, KhosraviNik & Mral, 2013; Kriesi 
e.a., 2008; Harris, 2016: 243-247) or fails to acknowledge the global dimensions of 
contemporary nationalist movements and activists (cfe. Hawley, 2016). Nationalism is still, to a 
large extend, understood in connection to a ‘national community’, the territory of the nation state 
and the state-institutions (cfe. Hosking, 2016). And even if the impact of digitalization is 
recognized and the transnational dimensions of contemporary nationalism are highlighted (cfe. 
Hylland Eriksen, 2007; Bernal, 2014), research is only slowly questioning the nationalist frame. 
Nowhere, at least to my knowledge, is it highlighted, that nationalist movements in the 21st 
century are de facto turning into global movements.    
 
For some reason, globalization is mostly imagined as a force from the outside: a force that puts 
pressure on the (nation)-state and as such becomes an a priori explanation for the rise of 
nationalist, radical right and extreme-right parties. Take for example Hosking (2016: 212) who in 
answering the question why there is a revival of nationalism in Europe, stresses that the nation is 
‘inherently better’ than international systems to uphold trust and organize solidarity. The reason 
is found in the fact that this particular community is better at absorbing ‘symbolic systems’. 
Nationalism is thus (1) solely imagined within the territory of the nation-state and (2) cultural 
globalization is completely absent in his analysis. Such arguments, can themselves be read as 
examples of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1994).  
 
Another emblematic case can be found in the reader ‘West European politics in the age of 
globalization’ (Kriesi e.a., 2008). Even though ‘globalization’ is at the heart of this reader, the 
structure of the book itself is a clear example of the focus on vertebrate systems and 
‘methodological nationalism’. Each chapter focuses ‘on the effects of globalization on national 
politics’ (Kriesi e.a., 2008: 3) of one (nation-)state. Nationalism and the rise of nationalist 
politics are thus seen, framed and presented as a reaction to globalization that is supported by 
sticking up for ‘the losers of globalization’.  
These arguments start from a methodological nationalism, and as a result they fail to see that the 
nation, and nationalist politics and activism have structurally changed in the last decennia.  
First of all, globalization is not an outside force anymore, the nation-state in itself is to a large 
extend globalized as part of ‘neoliberal destatisation’ (Swyngedouw, 2005, 1998; Jessop, 2002). 
After the fall of the Soviet Empire and the triumph of capitalism, states operated under a new 
sphere of influences. Governmentality was now embedded in a complex network of actors – 
NGO’s, States and supranational institutions like the EU, the World Bank and the IMF. 
“Governance as an arrangement of ‘governing beyond-the-state’ was now embedded in 
‘apparently horizontally organized and polycentric ensembles’ (Swyngedouw, 2005: 1992). The 
political elites, nations but also parts of the state like national securities apparatuses (Bigo, 2006) 
were more and more embedded in transnational networks. The (nation-)state lost its monopoly 
over governance in the last decades (McArthur, -).  
Secondly, in the last decades the nation and nationalism became transnational phenomena. The 
population of the (nation-)state became increasingly ‘international’, or ethnically and culturally 
diverse (Vertovec, 2006; Maly, 2014; Arnaut e.a. 2016). This resulted in what Appadurai (2006: 
8) calls the ‘anxiety of incompleteness’ where ‘the presence of (small) numbers of migrants that 
remind the majorities of the (small) gap which lies between their position as a majority and there 
the horizon of an unsullied national goal’. This internationalization of the nation resulted not 
only in a new revival of nationalism, it also created a ‘new nationalism’ claiming to be inclusive 
and multicultural by focusing on cultural assimilation (Maly, 2012 & 2016) and cultural 
chauvinism. 
Thirdly, we see that the internet and the rise in mobility caused a deterritorialization of the 
nation. National(ist) citizens living abroad or ‘stateless’ people were still fighting or at least 
dreaming about their own nation. Digital media facilitated this process of ‘transnationalization’ 
of the nation and nationalism (Hylland Eriksen, 2007; Bernal, 2014).  
Nationalism and the nation have fundamentally changed in the last decades. It would therefore 
be strange to assume that nationalistic activism has not changed under influence of digital media 
and (cultural) globalization. There is now a booming and a rich literature on the impact of 
digitalization on political activism (see for example Klein, 2000; Tufekci, 2017, Wolfson, 2014, 
Roberts, 2013). In the period of high globalization, local activism against neo-liberalization 
became more and more embedded in transnational networks. The anti-globalization movement is 
a classic example, but the revolutions in the Middle East and even Al Qaeda an ISIS all had a 
global dimension (Tufekci, 2017). In all these political movements, we see that certain elements 
or cells operated only locally, but others operated on a truly global scale. In the timeframe of 
renewed nationalism and resistance against globalization, we witnessed the creation of 
transnational cellular systems of resistance. Some of these networks proved to be very stable 
over long periods of time (see for example Tufekci, 2017). It is remarkable, that this evolution in 
activism has not yet been researched in the context of nationalist activism.  
Many political scientists, scholars and journalists writing on nationalism, still tend to focus on 
vertebrate systems like the ‘state’ and supra-state structures like the EU, the VN or NATO to 
explain the rise of nationalism at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. By 
focusing on these structures, they inevitably reproduce the nation as the basic ‘political unit’ and 
fail to see the importance of cellular systems (Appadurai, 2006). Even Hylland Eriksen who 
rightly stresses that ‘in a ‘global era’ of movement and deterritorialisation, the Internet is used 
to strengthen, rather than weaken, national identities’ (Hylland Eriksen, 2007: 1) fails to step out 
of the nationalist framework. Only people who are national citizens are envisioned as potential 
carriers of its nationalism. So even in our understanding of transnational nationalism, the 
nationalist paradigm is dominant.  
To adequately overcome this, I propose an ethnographic and discourse oriented approach, 
focusing on ‘a close examination of small details’ (Bernal, 2014: 6). Such detailed focus on 
online activities of specific activist groups in specific contexts proofs to fruitful in updating our 
understanding of the impact of digitalization on nationalism. A lot of the contemporary work on 
globalization and digitalization from an anthropological, ethnographic, culture studies and 
sociolinguistics of globalization perspective is very insightful and can help to re-theorize 
nationalistic activism in times of digitalization and globalization (See Appadurai, 1996 & 2006; 
Blommaert, 2005, 2011 & 2018; Arnaut e.a. 2016; Maly, 2018a; Wang, 2018).  
 
Within this field, it is now more and more common to accept that digitalization and ‘high 
globalization’ have profoundly reshaped the world we live in. Despite a lot of vulgar literature 
and right-wing theories about globalization (see for example Barbar, 2002 or De Benoist, 2017), 
globalization did not turn the world into a village. Nor do we witness the creation of a global 
cosmopolitan world culture or Americanization that is destroying local (national) cultures.  
Globalization, as a cultural phenomenon, can be captured more precisely in terms of cultural 
flows embedded in scapes (Appadurai, 1996). Local practices or resources are not only 
globalized, but in turn they also ‘tend to become indigenized in one or another way’ (Appadurai, 
1996: 32).  
 
Topics like de-territorialization, transcultural flows and migration have become prominent topics 
and concepts in all kinds of fields within social sciences. But Blommaert argues compellingly 
that the mainstreaming of these theories and concepts did not change the dominant syntopy of 
many social sciences dedicated to globalization processes and migration. The established 
paradigm still focusses ‘on movement in a horizontal and stable place in a chronological time’ 
(Blommaert, 2011: 5). Blommaert stresses (2011:4) that high or neoliberal globalization forces 
us to think about the reorganization of Time and Space. This is especially relevant for research 
on nationalism where most research tends to describe ‘reality’ from a ‘local’ and national 
perspective. A space where things seem fixed in space and time. More concrete: the common 
assumption in the field seems to be that nationalistic activists are local activists active in 
local/national movements, organizations and political parties. And if the transnational 
dimensions of nationalism are analyzed, they still are still analyzed from a ‘national’, stable and 
fixed place.  
 
This perspective on ‘reality’ has blind spots, as it fails to consider how the global is present in 
the local and vice versa. In the remainder of the paper I will, 
 
(1) take up Blommaert’s argument to analyze the activism of the Flemish identitarian 
movement Schild & Vrienden. With him I will argue that we need to take ‘mobility’ or 
‘motion’ of resources as the starting point. This means that I will focus on how various 
spatiotemporal frames or scales interact with each other. This begs for an improved 
notion of ‘locality’. Local action, I will argue, is better understood as a potentially 
layered and transnational construct that puts together resources from different scales and 
thus different spatiotemporal frames together. In order to analyze that layeredness of 
local action, close attention to the context, to the history, the conditions of production, the 
uptake and the mobility of resources is of crucial importance. By focusing on this 
mobility of resources, and adopting a (digital) ethnographic (Varis, 2016), discourse-
oriented sociolinguistic approach I will try to overcome methodological nationalism.  
 
(2) not only take up Appadurai’s notion that in the latest phase of globalization, cellular 
systems have an important place, I will extend it and argue that nationalism, and thus the 
discursive battle for the nation (Maly, 2014), for the vertebrate system par excellence, is 
now also supported by cellular activism operating on global scale. This activism is 
embedded in digital infrastructures. This material dimension is important, and I will give 
it a central place in trying to understand global nationalist activism. Localness in global 
nationalist activism will be understood as creativity deployed in relation to specific 
larger-scale ‘infrastructural’ conditions. Arnaut, Karrebaek & Spotti (2017) use the image 
of ‘poiesis-infrastructure nexus’ to capture this dialectic relation. Central in that image is 
that local creativity (poiesis) is deployed in relation to ‘infrastructural’ conditions that 
provide norms, formats and (ideological) constraints. These infrastructures can be found 
offline, but also online.  
 
If we adopt this perspective on locality, global cultural flows, and the ‘poiesis-infrastructure 
nexus’ the seemingly local action of Schild & Vrienden becomes far more complex. We do not 
just see a Flemish movement of Flemish boys fighting for a Flemish nation with closed borders. 
From the moment, we look at locality and local action as a site where stuff from different scales 
comes together, we are immediately confronted with the complexity of explaining this type of 
activism, and the impossibility of explaining it without acknowledging its global dimensions.  
  
Global dimensions of Schild & Vrienden 
The activism format that Schild & Vrienden adopts during its intervention at the Gravensteen is a 
good starting point. This ‘repertoire of collective action’ (Tilly, 1974: 143-171) – spectacular but 
albeit small, local, offline but afterwards heavily mediated activism on social media– is not new 
and can certainly not to be understood as a ‘Flemish’ practice. It is an excellent example of a 
synchronized phenomenon. Schild & Vrienden uses the same activism formats as the pan-
European Identitarian activist movement Generation Identity. The different national and local 
identitarian movements are specialized in setting up such highly mediatized small-scale actions. 
This repertoire of collective action was first appropriated by the original French movement 
Generation Identitaire from organizations like GreenPeace to serve their nationalist cause. By 
now, we see it being used by New Right Identitarian movements all over Europe (Maly, 2018). 
And in the VS the Alt-Right is also ooking at these Identitarian tactics as examples to renew their 
movement and especially to take it offline (Spencer, 2017b).  
 
Not only the activism format is translocal, the discourse that Schild & Vrienden uses in the 
Facebook Video is a truly global product. Take for example how Schild & Vrienden frames the 
video in the accompanying Facebook-status:  
 
‘The Flemish Youth fights for its heritage and future. PS: The leftist tears are more visible in 
HD!’ (my translation from Dutch). 
 
The linguistic resources that are deployed here refer to different spatiotemporal frames. The first 
sentence clearly positions Schild & Vrienden as a Flemish movement fighting for a Flemish 
future and trying to protect its Flemish heritage. But there is more. They use a populist, or more 
concretely a ‘generational populist format’ (Maly, 2018): they speak in name of the ‘Flemish 
Youth’. That is also the dominant communicative frame in the Facebook video: Schild & 
Vrienden is positioned by its leader Dries Van Langenhove as the representatives of thé Flemish 
youth, and that Flemish youth seemingly hates ‘the leftists’.  
 
This frame indexes the discursive influence of Generation Identitaire. From the start, this 
Identitarian movement clearly positioned itself as a generational movement, fighting against the 
‘babyboomer’-generation or the ‘soixantehuitards’ who advocate multiculturalism and open 
borders’ (Generation Identity, 2013; Willinger, 2013). This discourse is consistently being 
reproduced by Dries Van Langenhove. In an interview with the Flemish mainstream newspaper 
De Morgen, he for instance says:  
 
“The left-wing elite of May 68 has had its say for way too long. (…) it is time for a new counter-
culture. Schild & Vrienden wants to be the avant-garde of this.” (De Ceulaer, 2018 (my 
translation).  
 
Also in the Facebook video, Dries Van Langenhove claims to speak in name of the Flemish 
youth. This Flemish youth is clearly constructed in distinction to the ‘the leftists’ who are 
imagined as to be from another generation. He for instanced claimed that the ‘leftists were all 40, 
50 or 60 years old. People who still believe in a dream that we should become a multicultural 
society with completely open borders” (Schild & Vrienden, 2018). The importance of this 
discursive frame is illustrated by the fact, that most ‘leftists’ present at the Gravensteen Castle 
were in their twenties and thirties and brought their children along. Reality had to be reframed to 
fit the Identitarian discourse. 
 
If we zoom out, we see that New Right activists around the world have adopted this discursive 
frame and position themselves as the voice of their generation. They all claim that they are just 
like the students in the sixties. And all of them, from the kekistani in the US (Maly, 2018c), De 
Lavendelkinderen in the Netherlands until the Identitarian activists of Generation Identity 
operating in the different European countries, frame themselves as the avant-garde of this youth 
counter-culture (cfe. Dols de Jong, 2018; Rusman, 2018). ‘The youth’, so goes the narrative, is 
anti-establishment and the establishment is dominated by baby boomers or in other terms cultural 
Marxists. This frame is a first truly global dimension of contemporary local nationalist activism. 
 
If we now zoom in on the second part of the status update, we see a reference to a different 
spatiotemporal frame. The concept of ‘leftists tears’ in the status-update is an index of the 
influence of the alt-right movement in the VS. In the US, Alt-Right activists and 4channers 
predominantly use the concept ‘liberal tears’ to make fun of the ‘liberals’ and the ‘lefties’ who 




Countless memes are produced and distributed reproducing this idea (see image 1). Through 
digital media, these memes travel across borders and become global. New Rights activists 
around the world encounter these memes and adapt them for local purposes: they get 
deglobalized or indigenized. Liberal tears, in a Flemish context, would not really work as 
‘liberals’ in Flanders are commonly understood as a (center)-right party. ‘Leftist tears’ is thus an 
example of how globalization actually works: as processes of englobalization and 
deglobalization. This adaptation not only shows how digital media enable the mobility of 
resources, it also is an index of the global dimension of local action. It shows how local activism 




Metapolitics, locality and synchrony  
The Alt-Right, as a result of the electoral victory of Donald Trump has become an important 
center in producing discursive materials to further a New Right agenda on a global scale (Maly, 
2018). This discursive ‘reference’ to the Alt-Right in the status-update of Schild & Vrienden is 
not a coincidence. It is an index of the systematic global nature of this type of nationalist 
activism, and the rising influence of the Alt-Right in this niche. This influence is also visible in 
the adoption of the meme as a metapolitical instrument.  
 
Metapolitics is a key word within New Right movement worldwide and refers to the long-term 
strategy of GRECE (Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilisation Européenne), 
better known as La Nouvelle Droite, the school of thought of Alain De Benoist, Guillaume De 
Faye and Dominique Venner founded in 1968 (Maly, 2018b). Metapolitics was the heart of the 
GRECE  project, it starts from ‘the primacy of culture over politics as the premise to a revolution 
in the spirit of ‘right-wing Gramscism’ (Griffin, 2000). This was more than just a strategy, it was 
also what was used to position this ‘school of thought’ as ‘new’ and thus seemingly different 
from the ‘old right’1. Nouvelle Droite intellectuals like Alain De Benoist openly quoted leftist 
sources and positioned themselves as 'ni droite, ni gauche'. Metapolitics gave them an aura of 
intellectualism and moderation, despite the very radical anti-Enlightenment nature of their 
project (Maly, 2018; Zienkowski, in review).  
 
The theories, concepts, ideas and the intellectuals that La Nouvelle droite has promoted, give 
coherence to the New Right movements worldwide. This coherence is also visible in the types of 
infrastructures these movements set up. What is known today as the Alt-Right in the US, 
gradually came into existence as a polycentric network embedded in all kinds of digital media 
(Counter Currents, Vdare, Taki Magazine, American Rennaissance), think thanks (National 
Policy Institute), congresses and fora (Maly, 2018). All these online and offline infrastructures 
where set up as ‘metapolitical instruments’ and resemble the type of organizations New Right 
movements set up all over Europe (cfe. Salzborn, 2016; Griffin, 2000).  
 
                                                     
1 The adoption of concepts like New Right or Alt-Right in this paper should not be understood as normative: I do not 
in any way express agreement with the claim that New Right activists make, namely that there is a substantial or an 
epistemological difference between the ‘new’ and the so-called ‘old right’. On the contrary, I define the New Right 
as the post-WWII re-articulation of the two-century-old anti-Enlightenment tradition (Sternhell, 2010; Maly, 2018a 
& 2018). Several scholars like Bar-on (2012 & 2016), Salzborn (2016), Maly (2018a & 2018b), Zienkowski (in 
review) point out that the New Right not only draws upon the ideas of the conservative revolution (organic 
nationalism, …), but actually attacks Enlightenment ideas as representative democracy, equality, universal human 




These online and offline infrastructures connect the different cells of the Alt-Right into a 
networked movement that was united and operated as one actor under hashtags as #altright and 
#cuckservative in their discursive battle to get Trump elected (Hawley, 2017; Maly, 2018). Even 
though these cells frame themselves as promoting an extreme right alternative to the neoliberal 
and neoconservative Republican party (Nagle, 2017; Hawley, 2017; Maly, 2018), it is important 
to realize that this networked movement has global dimensions.  
 
(1) First of all, different actors and cells in that networked movement are not based in the US 
(Arktos is operating from London, Weev from The Daily Stormer lives in Europe and 
Red Ice is partly based in Sweden),  
(2) Secondly, in setting up these infrastructures and defining their metapolitical goal, several 
Alt-Right key figures like Richard Spencer, Greg Johnson or Daniel Friberg explicitly 
claimed to find inspiration in La Nouvelle Droite. 
 
Greg Johnson from Counter-Currents for instance not only edited a publication called ‘The North 
American New Right’, he explicitly frames the North American New Right as ‘a “metapolitical” 
movement modeled on the European New Right, but adapted to our own circumstances.” 
(Johnson, 2012: 1-2). Alt-Right figures like Greg Johnson and Richard Spencer, the radical right 
publishing house Arktos and Identitarian activists are best understood as indiginizations of the 
metapolitical and ideological agenda of La Nouvelle Droite. The Alt-Right exists, according to 
John Morgan (editor of the radical right publishing house Arktos) first and for most as “a culture 
primarily of blogs, memes, podcasts, and videos” which he claims is the “natural outgrowth of 
the anti-intellectualism inherent in Anglo-American political and cultural discourse (…)” 
(Morgan, 2017).  
 
One of the most successful metapolitical instruments of the Alt-Right was the appropriation of 
the meme and the embeddedness of the metapolitical battle in the ongoing culture war between 
4channers and the normies after Gamergate (Nagle, 2017: 24). This memification of the 
metapolitical battle for the ideals of the conservative revolution caused a global renewal of the 
metapolitical battle. This very specific repertoire of collective action – deeply embedded in the 
contemporary algorithmically determined public space – was very fast adopted by New Right 
cells around the world. It was globalized. 
 
The meme, and the Pepe-The-Frog memes (Nagle, 2017) in particular, became successful export 
products. Pepe-The-Frog not only got englobalized, he was also deglobalized/indigized or 
repatriated and mobilized for local metapolitical nationalistic battles. Even more, the helped to 
construct or at least connect different (individual) actors, movements and cells from different 
corners of the world and thus de facto contributed to a more and more networked Global New 
Right niche. Schild & Vrienden is a clear example of the organizational effects of these complex 
cultural and political flows. The movement was born online out of the online collaboration of 
Flemish nationalist students on an online Facebook community called ‘De fiere Vlaamse meme’ 




The profile pic of that Facebook community (see figure 3- is a good example of this complex 
notion of locality and the local nationalist action. Pepe-the-frog is mobilized for the Flemish 
nationalist cause. But whereas Pepe indexes contemporary internet-culture and Alt-Right 
metapolitics, the words ‘Schild en Vriend’, the Flemish flag and 1302 refer to a very different 
spatio-temporal frame. They refer, just like the name Schild & Vrienden, to the known and old 
Flemish nationalist myth about the so-called ‘Brugse metten’ in 1302. In this Flemish nationalist 
cult, the social conflict dimension is downplayed as to frame it as a first legendary Flemish 
nationalist battle against the French. In this myth, “Schild & Vriend” was used as a shibboleth to 
be able to identify the Frence enemies (Tollebeek, 1999). By choosing the name Schild & 
Vrienden the movement clearly positions itself in a very long tradition of Flemish nationalist 
politics. 
 
Virality, the Global New Right Netwerk and the poiesis-infrastructure 
nexus  
It is undeniable that these activists are Flemish nationalists. Not only do they reproduce classic 
Flemish nationalist discourses, they stand for an independent Flanders. At the same time, we can 
only understand their activism as a clear break with traditional Flemish nationalism. The 
metapolitical agenda of ‘De Fiere Vlaamse meme’ and ‘Schild & vrienden’, their discourse and 
the activism formats index the global dimensions of this local activism. The dominant use of 
English alone, would have been completely unthinkable for Flemish nationalists of the previous 
generations. Their local and blood-and soil nationalistic activism is a layered construct that puts 
together resources from different scales and spatiotemporal frames.  
 
One detailed look at the Schild & Vrienden webshop underlines this analysis even more. The 
stickers (figure 3) are sold as ‘metapolitical’ tools for offline activism. The slogans on these 
stickers can be categorized in three overarching categories pointing again to different 
spatiotemporal frames:  
(1) Old skool Flemish nationalist slogans (Leuven Vlaams, Schild & Vrienden, linkse ratten 
rol uw matten) and new skool ironic Flemish nationalist slogans (tis al de schuld van de 
sossen) 
(2) Pan European identitarian activism ( ‘Zekere grenzen, zekere toekomst’ refers to the 
German slogan ‘Sichere Grenzen, sichere zukunft’ from the German Identitäre 
Bewegung) 
(3) Alt-right and pro-Trump activism (Make Vlaanderen Great Again, It’s okay to be white, 




Figure 2: Stickers for sale in the Schild & Vrienden Webshop 
 
Schild & Vrienden exists through combining and adapting stuff from different New Right 
movements and thus from different spatiotemporal frames. It at this point that the concept of 
‘poiesis-infrastructure’ is useful. The stickers are unique in their mixture, but the creativity and 
the uniqueness is not endless, it exists only in local adaptations of global products. The 
infrastructural conditions create norms, formats and (ideological) constraints. The ‘creativity’ of 
Schild & Vrienden is not only constrained by the accepted formats, repertoires and discourses 
within the local and global New Right, but also by affordances of the mainstream digital media.   
 
The algorithmic preferences of the mainstream digital media co-construct activist formats. These 
algorithms are not passive, nor neutral: they have computational agency (Tufekci, 2015 & 2017). 
In order to use social media as a metapolitical instrument, one has to be able to drive traffic to 
one’s account. Driving traffic means that one not only has to produce content that resonates with 
a certain audience, the content should also be formatted for uptake. For it is that audience, in 
interaction with the content and the algorithms of a particular medium that will allow uptake of 
messages. The affordances of these digital media impose normative conditions and constraints 
on what can happen. Digital media only distribute (englobalized) your message if you know how 
to prepare your content for uptake.  
 
The semiotic and discursive material of Schild & Vrienden is thus the result of a complex 
dialogue with the different national and the truly global operating New Right cells and the 
mainstream algorithmic infrastructures of Facebook and YouTube. Their metapolitical activism 
can only be successful, if 
(1) They succeed in the reworking of globalized resources to fit the local and the global New 
Right context,  
(2) They succeed in tweaking the algorithmic preferences in order to help them distribute 
their metapolitical content.  
(3) Mobilize their network to push content to virality 
 
Let’s now return to our central case and zoom in how Schild & Vrienden prepared their content 
for uptake and how this Global New Right network is visible in local activism. First I shall look 
revisit the video and analyze at the level of ‘metapragmatics’ (Jacobs, 1997). This 
metapragmatical approach focuses on the indicators of the producer’s reflexive awareness of its 
audience and the communicative context. In other words, we can look at the producer’s intended 
audiences, the preferred uptake of this clip (Blommaert & Maly, 2016) and their knowledge of 
the communicative context. 
 
First fact is that the video fared quite well on Facebook. Facebook videos are a relatively new 
feature on Facebook, a feature Facebook launched to compete with YouTube. As a consequence, 
the digital platform pushes (short) videos on its platform. Secondly, videos on Facebook should 
have subtitles. As many people scroll through their newsfeed on their smartphone or computer in 
places where the sound of the video would be inappropriate, subtitles are a crucial feature to 
have ‘reach’ and ‘engagement’. Thirdly, there should be immediate interaction with the post in 
terms of likes and comments but especially in terms of ‘shares’ (Maly & Beekman, 2018). 
Failing to adhere to these format guidelines, means that the video will not ‘take off’ and thus fail 
in its metapolitical goals.  
 
The activists of Schild & Vrienden clearly know the game. The video is relatively short (2 
minutes 50 seconds), uses subtitles and was published 10 minutes before 10 o’clock in the 
morning, at a time when there is a peak of people on Facebook. The first people liking and 
commenting on the video, were largely members of Schild & Vrienden. They started tagging 
friends. The second category of people engaging with the post were militants of the extreme-
right Flemish party Flemish interest. But very soon, in a matter of minutes, a much broader 
uptake was realized. In the first 15 minutes, the video generated 330 views, 157 interactions, 17 
comments and 24 shares. After a half an hour, it generated 880 views, 221 interactions, 27 
comments and 41 shares. The uptake of the clip was thus quite spectacular and as a result the 




This uptake was not limited to Flanders or to Flemish activists, it very fastly circulated on a 
global scale. This spread was not a coincidence, the clip, from the very start, was designed for 
global uptake. The first indication of this is found in the video’s English title ‘Protecting our 
heritage’ and in the English subtitles. The use of English, especially considering the importance 
of the Dutch Language within the Flemish nationalist tradition, is remarkable and informs us the 
message itself was from the start produced with an international audience in mind.  
 
Communication is never generic, it is never intended for ‘all people’ around the world. 
Communication always addresses a specific type of people and excludes others. In this case, it is 
clear that they targeted the global New Right niche: the metapragmatical queues were perfectly 
managed. The video reproduces a discourse that is dominant within that niche. The enemy par 
excellence is framed as the ‘older generation’ of ‘multicultural’, ‘open border’ ‘leftists’. This 
generational populist frame resonates with the radical right, the identitarians and alt-right 
activists around the world.  
 
Global numbers and local facts 
When we now look at the uptake, we see that the producers ticked all the boxes: not only did the 
clip go viral two times in a row, it gathered a solid number of views (92k) and (2.2K) likes. If we 
zoom in on these likes, we see that around 1500 profiles ‘like’ the video, 536 ‘love’ the video, 
and around 100 profiles ‘cry’ or are ‘angry’ or ‘surprised’. Virality, and the likes, shares, 
comments and overall ‘Facebook reach’ is an important aspect of the populist discourse of Schild 
& Vrienden. Uptake and reach is framed as proof of their relevance and their recognition and 




In figure 4 we see a Tweet of Dries Van Langenhove, the president of Schild & Vrienden 
claiming that their Facebook community has a monthly reach of 250.000 a 500000 people. This 
is used as proof that ‘the other’ – the left - is living in a bubble. It is this quantitative dimension 
of ‘reach’ and views that is used to support the claim that Schild & Vrienden speaks ‘in name of 
the Flemish youth’. The 10.000 followers of the Schild & Vrienden Facebook community Page, 
the virality of their posts in mass media and the reporting on this social media reality in 
mainstream news (cfe Cools & Andries, 2018) construct an image of popularity. It also 
contributes to the idea that Schild & Vrienden should be reported on: if you like it or, not: they 
exist (De Ceulaer, 2018).  
 
Numbers and virality are social facts. The activism of Schild & Vrienden becomes visible 
through the mediatization on social media. And this visibility is at least partially realized by 
mobilizing an audience to click, share and comment on these posts. It is at this point that the 
global network enters the equation. If we zoom in on the Facebook shares – the activity that 
generates the largest reach on Facebook (Maly & Beekmans, 2018) – we get to see just how 
‘niched’ and ‘targetted’ but also how global their audience is. In total, he post generated 1.2K 
shares. The first day, 8 March 2018, it was shared 127 times (of which only one profile shared it 
to criticize them). This huge amount of shares could easily be mistaken for popularity among the 
Flemings, the Flemish youth or even amongst ‘concerned citizens’ approving the message and 
the offline intervention of Schild & Vrienden. 
 
Such a superficial reading, in which the shares in themselves are read through a populist 
framework, only contributes to the metapolitical goal of these shares: it legitimates the populist 
claim that they speak in name of the Flemish youth. The shares, and the superficial reading of 
shares as an instance of ‘networked individualism’ Castells (2015) fails in many ways. From the 
moment, one starts to give attention to the ‘details’ and start investigating the profiles that share 
the video, we see the ‘organized’ nature of this ‘popularity’. This is not a spontaneous movement 
that starts from a spark of outrage. These are not just ordinary citizens showing their support of 
this message by sharing. It is also not an act of ‘slacktivism’ or feel good activity as Morozov 
(2011) and Gladwell (2010) would call it.  
 
I would propose that these shares are best understood as metapolitical activism. It is part of a 
global cultural war (Nagle, 2017) embedded in a transnational New Right niche. It connects 
individuals, activists, organizations or cells from different places into one global New Right 
Network. This network operates on different scales, from the local to the truly global, from the 
individual to the organization. Even though, most individuals may not know each other, de facto, 
they are all part of one a hybrid global New Right nationalist activistic network.  
 
Let us, to illustrate this claim, look in more detail at the profiles sharing the Facebook video from 
Schild & Vrienden. From the 123 profiles that share the post on that first day, only 55 indicate 
that they are from Belgium (4 profiles do not give a country of origin). 17 people claim to be 
from the United States of America, 13 people indicate that they live in the UK. Profiles from 24 




If we look at the last 70 shares of the video, we see that the Belgian profiles are only good for 
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‘home-base’. Especially these last 16 profiles are truly ‘global’ New Right activistic profiles: 





Facebook and the anti-Enlightenment ideoscape.  
This global New Right audience was not reached as an accident du parcours, it was addressed 
through the explicit use of English, and the message itself. If we scrutinize the different sharing 
profiles we encounter what we with Appadurai (1996: 36) could call an ‘ideoscape’: a global 
cultural flow consisting out of a string of images, often directly political and connected to the 
state or to the counter-movements trying to capture (a piece of) state power.  
 
In the nineties, the master narrative in these ideoscapes was the Enlightenment narrative, with the 
now so familiar chain of terms, concepts and images like ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’. 
The ideoscape under scrutiny here, has a very different master narrative. The master concept in 
this chain of concepts and ideas is without a doubt ‘the nation’ and it connects with familiar 
concepts as ‘our values’, ‘heritage’, ‘norms’, ‘our culture’, ‘borders’, ‘anti-migration’, ‘anti-left’, 
‘anti-liberal’, ‘anti cultural marxism’ and ‘anti-globalism’. It is an anti-Enlightenment narrative 
(Sternhell, 2010) that questions the democratic Enlightenment discourse and its stress on 
equality, freedom, universal human right. These activists fight for a world order based on 
cultural difference, on borders and homogenic nations or entities, not for democracy and not for 
inalienable Universal Human Right.  
 
Even though this ideoscape is characterized by a remarkable ideological coherence, it should be 
stressed that it still is a layered and polycentric landscape. For example, within this anti-

















local political conceptualizations or integrated in different chains of concepts. Concretely. The 
nation can be used as an ethno-cultural construct or in its blood-and-soil conceptualization 
depending on the individual and his relation to the large socio-political and cultural context.  
 
The conceptual chain in which concepts are used can also differ very much. If we for instance 
compare the Romanian profiles sharing the Schild & Vrienden video with the Belgian profiles, 
we see that in the Romanian profiles there is far more stress on Religion, traditional family 
values and homophobic content, whereas the Belgian profiles in general stress the ‘acceptance of 
LGBTQ+’ as part of ‘our tolerant culture’. These differences in the New Right or anti-
Enlightenment ideoscape can be explained by looking at how they intersect with the local, 
national and transnational media- and ethnoscapes. Or put differently, how they interact with the 
infrastructures working on different scales.  
 
The ideological consistency can on the other hand be explained by the existence of a global New 
Right mediascape. This infrastructural dimension of the New Right Network became very visible 
when I revisited all the sharing profiles of the Schild & Vrienden video on 30 May 2018. At that 
time, Tommy Robinson, the former head of the English Defence League and Pegida UK who is 
well networked with Martin Sellner of the Austrian chapter of Generation Identity, was 
sentenced to 13 months of imprisonment for contempt for the court. Robinson was arrested on 
Friday 22 May 2018 and pleaded guilty. In 5 hours he was arrested, sentenced and jailed. New 
Right activists around the world set up petitions and posted their outrage on social media. His 
arrest was framed as proof of the power of the liberal elite and the fact that truth had to be 
silenced. If we look at the profiles inititially sharing the Schild & Vrienden post, we see that 51 
of the 123 profiles also shared at least one post on Tommy Robinson between 28 and 30 May. 
And again, this was an example of the global dimension of this New Right activist network. 
Activists from 12 different countries posted memes, petitions and outrage in favor of Tommy 
Robinson. 
 
The global New Right Network  
The fast spread of digital media has given New Right activists around the world and especially in 
the West access to a vast right-wing media landscape. Not only the big names in the New Right 
bubble – such as Milo, Steve Bannon, Richard Spencer or Alain de Benoist but also the local 
activists now have access to these transnational space and cultural flows. Some of the 
infrastructures like Arktos, Red Ice and the Alt-Right crowd-funding platform work on a truly 
global scale. Others work on national and transnational scale, but they are all connected in that 




Important to stress here is that, in the case of New Right activists, the offline and online, the 
local and the global are inherently connected. New Right movements all over the world set up 
headquarters, Thinks Thanks, magazines and even offline libraries (Salzborn, 2016). The offline 
meeting and network spaces likes the Scandza Forum, the yearly conference of the National 
Policy Institute or American Rennaissance establish strong ties. Or take for example, the 
Summer university that the French branch of the pan-European movement sets up on a yearly 
basis. Generation Identitaire organizes this training camp not only to train activists from 
different European Identitarian movements, but to also construct a network of strong ties among 
identitarian activists on a European scale. The leader of Schild & Vrienden Dries Van 
Langenhove was one of the participants of the Summer University of Generation Identitaire in 
2015 (Personal communication, 2018). The fact that the format of the intervention of Schild & 
Vrienden at the Castle in Ghent follows the example of the mediatized activism of Generation 
Identitaire is thus not just copycat behavior through a digital network, it is also embedded in a 
larger network of cells working online and offline and operating on different scales.  
 
It would thus be wrong to see the offline structures as different or more ‘real’ than the online 
manifestation of these organizations. All these offline infrastructures are connected partly 
through the internet and partly through offline networks. Generation Identitaire for instance, does 
not only set up Facebook (community) pages and websites, it also sets up different local club 
houses and boxing clubs. These offline spaces are used to manage and organize the troop but als 
to produce content for the online spaces. Offline protest is for example also used for online 
mobilization and a long-term metapolitical battle. Digital media enable the fast and transnational 
distribution of discourse, the upscaling of local activism and facilitate global communication and 
organization.  
 
Key figures and platforms in that movement do not keep it a secret that they want to build a 
global nationalist movement. Altright.com has an explicit Western/global scope, aiming to bring 
together the best writers ‘Alt-Right, in North America, Europe, and around the world.’ 
(Altright.com/about, 2018) in order to be ‘an essential organ in the international Alt-Right—
a Breitbart for the age to come, not the one that has passed.” (Spencer, 2017a). This dream of 
building an international New Right network is also visible in the connections between 
Generation Identity activists in Europe and Alt-Right figures and movements in the US. Martin 
Sellner, from the Identitarian Bewegung Austria and a key-figure in the pan-European 
organization of the identitarian movement, not only has contacts with the youth division of 
UKIP, he is also connected with Lauren Southern and dates Brittany Pettibone (an American Alt-
Right vlogster). These three activists got to know each other during their visit to the Defend 
Europe mission of Generation Identitair. Since then all three of them are clearly operating on a 
global scale trying to make these blood-and soil nationalist movements part of an international 
movement fighting for a nationalist world order.  
 
The same evolution is also visible on the highest political level. Farage the former leader and 
Face of UKIP is not only active on the European scale, he was invited several times to the US to 
support Trump during rally’s. And just like Farage after Brexit, Bannon after Trump and 
Breitbart is operating on a global scale. In March 2018 Bannon started a European tour meeting 
extreme and far right politicians and activists and speaking at different rally’s. He speeched 
about ‘the future of international populist nationalism’ during an event set up by the 
conservative weekly magazine Weltwoche. During the speech he praised Christoph Blocher as 
the ‘Trump before Trump’ (Breitbart, 2018). He travelled to Germany to have a meeting with 
Alternative fur Deutschland, from where he went to Italy to support Michael Salvini from La 
Lega. From Italy, he travelled to France to speak at the Front National Congress fully supporting 
Marine Le Pen. And he plans to visit the extreme-right party Vlaams Belang in Belgium in 2018. 
Bannon is also very explicit about his goals, he sees himself as “the infrastructure, globally, for 
the global populist movement” (New York Times, 2018). 
 
The New Right movements invest heavily in online and offline infrastructures that support the 
movement not only on a local or national scale, but also on pan-European and a global scale. The 
Global New Right Network thus does not merely exist out of networked individuals (Miller, 
2011). The individuals/profiles are to a large extend embedded in different cells and 
infrastructures. If we for instance look at the Belgian profiles sharing the Schild & Vrienden post 
on the first day (and thus helping it going viral), we see that the majority of them also shares 
posts of and self-identifies with the extreme-right Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish interest). This global network is thus not solemnly digital, in part it rests on classic 
local (offline) infrastructures like this (youth divisions) of political parties like Vlaams Belang 
and N-VA (New Flemish Alliance), but also the student-unions like KVHK and NSV from 
which Schild & Vrienden recruit most of their members. 
 
Online, the pages of the leading politicians of Vlaams Belang also function as infrastructures 
around which cells of activists are formed. And of course, the Facebook community of Schild & 
Vrienden and their meme-community-page ‘De Fiere Vlaamse meme’ are also infrastructures 
that facilitate the growing of cells. Even though these cells are mainly operating at a local level 
they are, through the affordances of social media like Facebook, globally connected. A lot of the 
Belgian profiles sharing and showing support for the #freetommy intervention, did this by 
sharing a post from Vlaams Belang president Tom Van Grieken or by sharing the post of Schild 
& Vrienden.  
 
 
All these individuals, local and global cells together, operating on different scales, organize and 
structure the cultural flows within the global New Right ideoscape. They function as hubs that 
connect and mobilize local activists for global issues and global activists for local issues. The 
UK-pages like Identity Bloc England, Traditional Britain Group and Europe Defence League do 
not only support Tommy Robinson and typical ‘British’ messages, they were also amongst the 
most influential platforms sharing the Schild & Vrienden video.  
 
It is remarkable to find that most of the reach of the Schild & Vrienden video is not realized by 
the sharing of local individuals, but through the sharing of the post by (non-Flemish) pages and 
communities. This is remarkable, because the Facebook algorithms favor ‘personal profiles’ 
(Arbel, 2018). Pages only generate 4% of the Newsfeed traffic. Nevertheless, we see, in the case 
of the first day of sharing, that 110 individual profiles sharing the video 115 times only managed 
to generate a measly 158 likes and 30 additional shares in total. 13 (community)-pages (most of 
them with no connection to Flanders or even Belgium), on the other hand, sharing it 13 times, 
generated a whopping 808 likes and 195 additional shares in that first day.  
 
The pages and communities clearly function as important hubs that structure the global flows in 
the New Right niche, and organize and mobilize local cells for global activism. Many of these 
pages have a clear ‘local goal and audience’, but nevertheless support other radical New Right 
nationalist movements around the world by sharing their content.  
 
The page that generated the most shares (75) and likes (108) for the Schild & Vrienden video 
was ‘Weekblad ‘t Pallieterke’. ‘t Pallieterke was founded in 1945 as a right-wing, Flemish 
nationalist weekly close to the extreme-right Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang. It is 
through their sharing, that several Vlaams Belang militants started sharing the video. And we see 
the same dynamic on a translocal scale where Facebook pages & communities engage local 
militants in sharing content. Pages like ‘Trump 2020’, Quotidian Conservative News and Red 
symposium were all set up in 2015, use a very similar design and duplicate content from each 
other. They were clearly set up to support Trump. Today they still function as supporting 
platforms for Trump, but they also function as infrastructures of this global New Right activist 
network. And the same is true for pages like ‘Boer: Aktueel’ (47 likes and 28 shares), the Finnish 
Defence League (20 likes and 5 shares), White is beautiful (219 likes and 38 shares) or the 
Traditional Britain Group (208 likes and 70 shares) who trigger local activists to share the video.  
 
Some of the Facebook pages, communities and even profiles are truly global. The profile of 
‘Alan Gerard’ is interesting in this respect. The profile shared the Schild & Vrienden video a 
whopping 21 times. The profile does not mention a location, does not have a profile pic, but does 
manage to have more than 1300 friends. On 30 May alone, he shared more than 60 posts, all 
connected to New Right political movements and politicians around the world: ranging from pro-
Tommy-posts, over post supporting Le Pen and promoting anti-migration. One of the most 
influential communities in generating likes (169) and shares (22) for the Schild & Vrienden 
video is called ‘Triggering Memes for Regressive Teens II’. This Facebook community of more 
than 29000 Facebook profiles is truly global, generating shares and likes for the Schild & 
Vrienden video by profiles from the UK, Canada, Romania, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, 
Australia and the US.   
 
This global New Right Network sharing and liking posts to support New Right movements and 
politicians has impact way outside their niche. It not only succeeded in triggering Flemish 
mainstream media to report on Schild & Vrienden, it succeeded in attracting worldwide 
attention. And the same thing happened with the pro-Tommy Robinson activism. The global 
spread of pro-Tommy messages on social media was also taken offline. In the Dutch parliament 
it was Wilders who raised the issue. As a result of these online and offline pressures, the 
mainstream press started reporting. This increases their following, the reach of their platforms 





In this paper, I have argued that the activism of Schild & Vrienden can only be fully grasped if 
we look at it as layered activism, bringing together practices, semiotic and discursive materials 
from very different origins and scales. Their local nationalistic activism has an important global 
dimension and the impact of their activism is, at least partially, generated by the upscaling of its 
activism. It is in this upscaling that a marginal movement on a local scale can organize virality 
online and create the idea that they are representing ‘concerned citizens’.  
 
Access and control over the higher scale is unevenly distributed and it has long been the 
privilege of the elites. Digitalization made upscaling attainable for more and more people, 
including for the New Right activists. All over the world, we see a rise of New Right movements 
and whenever we analyze them, we see a remarkable, ideological, strategical, discursive 
coherence and coherence in the repertoires of resistance. This coherence can only be partially 
explained by pointing at the historical ideological work of La Nouvelle Droite, more important is 
the impact of digitalization. It is at this point that the concept of ‘poiesis-infrastructure’ proved to 
be very useful. Local nationalistic activism is creatively produced in interaction with resources 
circulating through digital infrastructures and the affordances of mainstream digital media. 
 
Digitalization has provided these nationalist movements with powerful tools to connect and 
collaborate with other activists around the globe. They effectively use the scale-advantages, 
network effects and the benefits of cellular structures to fight for the (re)construction of the old 
19th century vertebrate system par excellence: the (blood and soil) nation. Such 
‘synchronization’ is, as we know, a tactic of power (Blommaert, 2005: 136). The denial of the 
layered nature of this activism, its format and its discourse contributes to its discursive power. It 
is these power effects of synchronization that forces political scientists to not only bring in a 
focus on discourse, and thus of the history of that discourse, but also to move beyond 
methodological nationalism and focus on the embeddedness of these discourses in infrastructure 
and networks of cellular systems.  
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